



Global Investment Research

US Economic Outlook

Jobless Growth

November 2025

David Mericle
Chief US Economist

Goldman, Sachs & Co.

+1 212-357-2619

david.mericle@gs.com


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
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Fed: We Expect Two More 25bp Cuts This Year and Two More in 2026 to a Terminal Rate of 3.0-3.25%



Labor Market: Job Growth Has Slowed to 25k/Month, Below Our 70k/Month Estimate of the Breakeven Rate




* We estimate this as $0.75 \times 3\text{-month average payroll growth} + 0.25 \times 9\text{-month average payroll-adjusted household employment growth}$; see "How to Read the Employment Report." We adjust for the earlier undercounting of immigration; see "Do the Official Statistics Fully Capture the Recent Surge in Immigration?" We adjust for potential revisions to payroll growth from the incorporation of QCEW data.




*Cyclical labor force participation rate and multiple job holders.

The Labor Market Has Softened More Than Necessary and More Than the Unemployment Rate Alone Suggests




The Low-Hiring, Low-Firing Labor Market Also Risks Locking Out the Unemployed and New Graduates




Note: The churn rate can be computed between 2000Q4 (first available JOLTS release) and 2024Q4 (latest available BED release).

Alternative Data Available During the Shutdown Show Better Job Growth but Further Softening in September





* Includes hiring plans from Manpower and NFIB; household expectations for job growth and changes in the unemployment rate from UMich and Conference Board; measures of job growth from ADP, Intuit, Homebase, and Revelio; layoffs consisting of initial claims, WARN notices, and Challenger job cuts; and the employment components of our manufacturing and nonmanufacturing survey trackers.




* For 2020-present, uses average job openings implied by JOLTS, Indeed, and LinkUp.

** As a share of covered employment.

GDP Growth: Looks Better Than Initially Expected—We Are Tracking Q3 Growth at 3.6% and 2025 Q4/Q4 at 1.9%




The Economy Is Not Just Holding Up Because of AI, Whose (Measured) Impact Is Smaller Than Thought




*Excluding frontloading of imports

And This Should Be the Hard Period—The Tariff Drag Will Abate, and the Fiscal Boost Will Kick in Next Year ...




* Impact of current immigration rate relative to the average pre-pandemic rate of about 1mn per year.

... As Front-Loaded Tax Cuts and Spending Increases Provide a Positive Impulse Before Spending Cuts Arrive




Jobless Growth: Solid GDP Growth Alongside Modest Job Growth Is Likely to Be Normal in the Future




* Includes our estimates of the contributions from undermeasured AI investment in GDP, the impact of the QCEW revisions on hours, and the undermeasurement of hours in the productivity statistics.

Tech and High-Skilled Industries Have Led a Rebound in Productivity Growth, Which AI Should Push Even Higher




Population Aging and Below-Normal Immigration Will Keep Labor Supply Growth Low in the Years Ahead



*Based on CBO estimates.


**Based on immigration court cases and immigration enforcement data from the DHS, CBP, and ICE.

Will Rapid Technological Progress Prevent Labor Demand from Keeping up with Even Modest Labor Supply Growth?





Note: Share of management teams that mentioned both AI and employment-related words in the same sentence on Russell 3000 quarterly conference calls.


Still Largely a Hypothetical Concern—Occupational Disruption Has Not Been That High in the Last Decade ...



... and AI Is Weighing on Hiring of Young Tech Workers but Hasn't Yet Had a Major Impact on the Labor Market




But Faster Technological Change Usually Means Slightly Higher Unemployment, Lower Inflation, and Lower Rates




* TFP shocks based on the Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) methodology.

** Share of workers changing occupation in a given quarter (Yale Budget Lab data).





* TFP shocks based on the Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) methodology.

The Full Consequences Might Not Become Clear Until a Recession, Like the “Jobless Recovery” After 2001




Inflation: A Two-Part Story of a Still Falling Underlying Trend Alongside a Moderate One-Time Tariff Bump



*Average of Costar, Yardi, and Zillow measures of rent growth.

After Six Months, the Passthrough Rate from Tariffs to Consumer Prices Has Reached 55%, Lower Than in 2019




*This estimation method may capture spillover effects (e.g. domestic and any foreign producers not directly affected by tariffs might raise their prices to take advantage of tariff protection).


**The effect for t+6 is estimated based on the initial 10% China tariff implemented in February, the effect for t+5 is estimated based on tariffs implemented in February and March, and the effect for t+4 is estimated based on tariffs implemented in February, March, and April including the 10% "reciprocal" tariff.

We Expect US Consumers to Eventually Bear 70% of the Cost of the Tariffs as Businesses Pass Costs Along

Division of Tariff Costs* as of August,
Based on Estimates Derived from PCE Data
Through August and Import Price Data Through July




GS Baseline of Eventual Division of Tariff Costs*




*Tariffs in effect from February to October.

**The share of tariff costs borne by US businesses is a net amount. Some businesses probably absorbed a larger share of tariff costs, while other businesses that competed with imported goods likely raised their prices.



A One-time Tariff Bump Pushes Core PCE Inflation to 3.0% Even as the Underlying Trend Approaches 2%



Fiscal Sustainability: Tax & Spending Changes + Tariffs + Rising Interest Expense Keep Deficit on a Similar Path



Higher Market Interest Rates Have Made the Fiscal Trajectory Look Far Worse Than It Did Last Cycle




The Longer We Wait to Undertake Deficit Reduction, the Larger the Fiscal Consolidation Will Have to Be

| Deficits, Debt, and Fiscal Consolidation Required by Year* | | | |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
| | 2025 | 2029 | 2035 |
| US Fiscal Position, GS Forecasts | | | |
| Primary Balance (% of GDP) | -3.0% | -2.9% | -2.9% |
| Overall Budget Balance (% of GDP) | -6.1% | -6.6% | -7.8% |
| Debt-to-GDP | 99.7% | 107.1% | 125.0% |
| Primary Balance Required | | | |
| 1) Primary Balance Required to Stabilize the Debt-to-GDP Ratio | 0.7% | 0.8% | 1.1% |
| 2) Primary Balance Required to Keep Real Interest Expenses Below 2% of GDP | 0.5% | 0.8% | 1.5% |
| 3) Primary Balance Required to Keep Real Interest Expenses Below 2% of GDP, Interest Rates Rise by 2bp for Every 1pp Increase in the Debt-to-GDP Ratio | 0.5% | 1.0% | 2.5% |
| Primary Balance Improvement Required | | | |
| 1) Primary Balance Improvement Required to Stabilize the Debt-to-GDP Ratio | 3.7pp | 3.7pp | 4.0pp |
| 2) Primary Balance Improvement Required to Keep Real Interest Expenses Below 2% of GDP | 3.5pp | 3.7pp | 4.4pp |
| 3) Primary Balance Improvement Required to Keep Real Interest Expenses Below 2% of GDP, Interest Rates Rise by 2bp for Every 1pp Increase in the Debt-to-GDP Ratio | 3.5pp | 3.9pp | 5.4pp |

* Fiscal projections assume that there is a 15% probability of recession each year and that recessions result in a 5pp cumulative increase in the primary deficit. We also assume that interest rates increase by 1bp for every 1pp increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio unless otherwise indicated.

The Risk of Falling onto an Explosive Debt Path Rises the Longer We Let the Debt and Interest Expense Grow



* We assume that deficit reduction starts in the year shown and takes 10 years to reach the targeted primary surplus. We simulate shocks to growth, interest rates, and the deficit based on historical data and assess how probable it is that after 25 years the debt/GDP ratio rises to a level where the economy cannot avoid an explosive debt trajectory even with the maximum assumed primary budget surplus.

US Economic Forecasts

THE US ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

(% change on previous period, annualized, except where noted)

| | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | Q1 | 2025 Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | 2026 Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------|--------|----------|------------|--------|----------|----------|------------|--------|--------|
| OUTPUT AND SPENDING | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | -0.6 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 1.0 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Real GDP (annual=Q4/Q4, quarterly=yoy) | 1.3 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.3 |
| Consumer Expenditures | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 0.6 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Residential Fixed Investment | -8.1 | -7.8 | 3.2 | -1.8 | -1.7 | 1.9 | -1.0 | -5.1 | -2.8 | -5.0 | -2.5 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Business Fixed Investment | 6.5 | 7.3 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 3.8 | 9.5 | 7.3 | 2.4 | -1.4 | 2.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Structures | 3.5 | 16.7 | 1.1 | -5.3 | -1.9 | 2.6 | -3.1 | -7.5 | -7.1 | -3.0 | -2.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Equipment | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 7.4 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 21.3 | 8.5 | 4.0 | -7.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Intellectual Property Products | 11.7 | 6.2 | 3.5 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 15.0 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Federal Government | -3.3 | 3.3 | 3.8 | -1.2 | 1.7 | 0.9 | -5.6 | -5.3 | 3.0 | -17.5 | 22.5 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| State & Local Government | 0.0 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 3.1 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 |
| Net Exports (\$bn, '17) | -1,024 | -925 | -1,033 | -1,081 | -877 | -909 | -1,381 | -1,058 | -997 | -890 | -867 | -872 | -880 | -889 |
| Inventory Investment (\$bn, '17) | 146 | 47 | 44 | 36 | 25 | 61 | 172 | -18 | -8 | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 |
| Nominal GDP | 9.8 | 6.7 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 2.9 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 4.0 | 5.7 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.9 |
| Industrial Production, Mfg. | 2.7 | -0.5 | -0.5 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 0.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| HOUSING MARKET | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Housing Starts (units, thous) | 1,552 | 1,421 | 1,371 | 1,291 | 1,224 | 1,315 | 1,401 | 1,354 | 1,234 | 1,176 | 1,179 | 1,209 | 1,239 | 1,269 |
| New Home Sales (units, thous) | 637 | 665 | 685 | 656 | 670 | 644 | 655 | 670 | 620 | 680 | 690 | 690 | 662 | 638 |
| Existing Home Sales (units, thous) | 5,083 | 4,103 | 4,067 | 3,983 | 3,978 | 4,132 | 4,127 | 3,990 | 3,888 | 3,926 | 3,937 | 3,956 | 3,989 | 4,030 |
| Case-Shiller Home Prices (%yoy)* | 7.5 | 5.3 | 3.8 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 3.8 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 0.4 | -0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| INFLATION (% ch, yr/yr) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Consumer Price Index (CPI)** | 6.4 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| Core CPI ** | 5.7 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.4 |
| Core PCE** † | 5.0 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 |
| LABOR MARKET | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Unemployment Rate (%)^ | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.3 |
| U6 Underemployment Rate (%)^ | 6.6 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 7.7 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.1 |
| Payrolls (thous, monthly rate) | 380 | 216 | 168 | 66 | 105 | 115 | 111 | 55 | 47 | 50 | 80 | 110 | 115 | 115 |
| Employment-Population Ratio (%)^ | 60.1 | 60.1 | 60.0 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 59.9 | 59.7 | 59.6 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 59.5 |
| Labor Force Participation Rate (%)^ | 62.3 | 62.5 | 62.5 | 62.3 | 62.2 | 62.0 | 62.5 | 62.3 | 62.3 | 62.3 | 62.3 | 62.2 | 62.2 | 62.2 |
| Average Hourly Earnings (%yoy) | 5.4 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| GOVERNMENT FINANCE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Federal Budget (FY, \$bn) | -1,376 | -1,694 | -1,833 | -1,775 | -2,000 | -2,100 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| FINANCIAL INDICATORS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FF Target Range (Bottom-Top, %)^ | 4.25-4.5 | 5.25-5.5 | 4.25-4.5 | 3.5-3.75 | 3-3.25 | 3-3.25 | 4.25-4.5 | 4.25-4.5 | 4-4.25 | 3.5-3.75 | 3.25-3.5 | 3-3.25 | 3-3.25 | 3-3.25 |
| 10-Year Treasury Note^ | 3.88 | 3.88 | 4.58 | 4.20 | 4.20 | 4.25 | 4.23 | 4.24 | 4.16 | 4.20 | 4.20 | 4.20 | 4.20 | 4.20 |
| Euro (€/€)^ | 1.07 | 1.11 | 1.04 | 1.19 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.08 | 1.18 | 1.17 | 1.19 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 1.24 | 1.25 |
| Yen (\$/¥)^ | 132 | 141 | 157 | 145 | 127 | 120 | 150 | 144 | 148 | 145 | 137 | 137 | 136 | 127 |

* Weighted average of metro-level HPIs for 381 metro cities where the weights are dollar values of housing stock reported in the American Community Survey. Annual numbers are Q4/Q4.

** Annual inflation numbers are December year-on-year values. Quarterly values are Q4/Q4.

† PCE = Personal consumption expenditures. ^ Denotes end of period.

Note: Published figures in bold.

GS Market Strategy Forecasts

| | Current | GS Forecasts | | | Forward pricing | | | Upside vs. forward pricing | | |
|---|---------|--------------|--------|--------|-----------------|--------|--------|----------------------------|---------|---------|
| | Level | 3m | 6m | 12m | 3m | 6m | 12m | 3m | 6m | 12m |
| Equities | | | | | | | | | | |
| S&P 500 | 6875 | 6800 | 7000 | 7200 | 6940 | 6993 | 7093 | -2% | 0% | 2% |
| STOXX Europe 600 | 577 | 560 | 570 | 580 | 579 | 577 | 575 | -3% | -1% | 1% |
| Topix | 3325 | 3300 | 3300 | 3400 | 3329 | 3302 | 3285 | -1% | 0% | 4% |
| MSCI AC Asia-Pac ex Japan | 732 | 720 | 730 | 755 | 737 | 742 | 745 | -2% | -2% | 1% |
| MSCI EM | 1408 | 1400 | 1425 | 1480 | 1420 | 1427 | 1437 | -1% | 0% | 3% |
| 10 Year Government Bond Yields | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | 3.98% | 4.20% | 4.20% | 4.20% | 4.04% | 4.08% | 4.17% | 16 bps | 12 bps | 3 bps |
| Germany | 2.62% | 3.00% | 3.03% | 3.18% | 2.68% | 2.73% | 2.82% | 32 bps | 30 bps | 36 bps |
| Japan | 1.67% | 1.71% | 1.77% | 1.86% | 1.76% | 1.82% | 1.94% | -5 bps | -6 bps | -8 bps |
| UK | 4.40% | 4.37% | 4.28% | 4.25% | 4.51% | 4.56% | 4.67% | -14 bps | -27 bps | -42 bps |
| 2 Year Government Bond Yields | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | 3.49% | 3.44% | 3.38% | 3.35% | 3.45% | 3.43% | 3.45% | -1 bps | -5 bps | -10 bps |
| Germany | 1.97% | 2.10% | 2.12% | 2.20% | 2.02% | 2.04% | 2.10% | 8 bps | 8 bps | 10 bps |
| Japan | 0.95% | 1.03% | 1.15% | 1.36% | 1.03% | 1.08% | 1.16% | 0 bps | 6 bps | 21 bps |
| UK | 3.78% | 3.84% | 3.78% | 3.75% | 3.73% | 3.72% | 3.81% | 10 bps | 6 bps | -6 bps |
| Corporate Bond Spreads (bps, upside vs. spot) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bloomberg USD IG | 74 | 85 | 85 | 85 | | | | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Bloomberg USD HY | 272 | 300 | 300 | 300 | | | | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| EM Hard Currency Sovereign | 271 | | | 330 | | | | | | 59 |
| Commodities | | | | | | | | | | |
| WTI Crude Oil (\$/bbl) | 61.3 | 59.0 | 56.0 | 49.0 | 60.3 | 60.0 | 59.9 | -2% | -7% | -18% |
| Brent Crude Oil (\$/bbl) | 65.6 | 63.0 | 60.0 | 53.0 | 64.0 | 63.7 | 63.6 | -2% | -6% | -17% |
| LME Copper (\$/mt) | 11,029 | 10,390 | 10,415 | 10,580 | 11,033 | 11,023 | 10,967 | -6% | -6% | -4% |
| TTF Natural Gas (EUR/MWh) | 31.3 | 39 | 34 | 29 | 31.8 | 29.9 | 31.1 | 23% | 14% | -7% |
| NYMEX Natural Gas (\$/mmBtu) | 3.44 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.06 | 3.63 | 4.24 | 11% | 24% | 6% |
| FX (upside vs. USD) | | | | | | | | | | |
| EUR/USD | 1.16 | 1.20 | 1.22 | 1.25 | 1.17 | 1.18 | 1.18 | 2% | 4% | 6% |
| USD/JPY | 153 | 150 | 148 | 145 | 151 | 150 | 148 | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| USD/CNY | 7.09 | 7.00 | 6.90 | 6.90 | 7.05 | 7.02 | 6.97 | 1% | 2% | 1% |

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.